Frontier Advisors, LLC

2015 Predictions

Posted on January 23, 2015 by Rick Lesan, CFA

“Prediction is very difficult, especially about the future” – Unknown

Every time the calendar year rolls over, investment pundits scramble to explain last year and predict the next. I spend the first couple weeks of each new year looking over these explanations and predictions as they come in, curious if any of them offer even a hint of usefulness to their audiences. Some get a lot of attention from the media and the investing public, driving conversation and even investment action, for better or worse. The truth is, it’s mostly for the worse.

Jason Zweig, the thoughtful author of “The Intelligent Investor” column for The Wall Street Journal (his column is always worth a read) had a good article on the subject on the last day of 2014. It’s titled “Lessons From Year of Market Surprises,” and in it he recounts how poorly recent predictions have turned out. He reminds us that interest rates were supposed to rise sharply in 2014 (they fell), oil prices were supposed to increase (they’ve been cut in half), and the stock market sell-off in October was supposed to be the beginning of a major correction (we’ve seen new highs since then, and the S&P 500 finished 2014 up over 13% including dividends). Practically all the industry strategists predicted similar things, and they all got it wrong last year.

What about those portfolio managers who make a living off “forecasting” markets as part of their investment process? They got pummeled last year by the very indices they were supposed to beat. A lot of that is simply bad stock picking, but a good portion of it is also the result of forecasts that didn’t come true. And 2014 wasn’t a fluke…actively managed strategies regularly fail to beat their appropriate indices.

Academics know how bad forecasters are. Brad Barber of the University of California at Davis has thoroughly studied the subject and maintains that there is no evidence that analyst estimates or forecasts add any value. Even folks whose job it is to issue forecasts don’t believe they are accurate. Ed Lazear, a professor at Stanford’s business school and former chair of the Council of Economic advisors, has commented on how unreliable forecasts from the Office of Management and Budget, the Council of Economic Advisors, the Congressional Budget Office, and the Department of the Treasury are and that “government forecasters might as well use a Ouija board.” Data reveals that the investment industry is no better at it.

My own personal experience with forecasting supports the research. At every previous firm for which I’ve worked, we always had our own forecasts. It’s a core part of what any typical investment firm does, and it tends to drive portfolio strategy at firms with centralized money management. What’s more, if done rigorously, it drives analyst research on individual securities when the firm’s forecasts are used as inputs for each analyst’s modeling efforts. Predictions over the short and medium term have a considerable impact on asset allocation decisions and security selection. The dirty secret, though, is that the forecasts driving our models and portfolios were often incorrect. There was always some curve ball thrown at us during the year for which we had not accounted, significantly impacting returns.

Those return effects were sometimes positive and sometimes negative. But it didn’t matter because our marketing group always figured out a way to explain our missed forecasts so we didn’t look as clueless as we actually had been in the case of negative impacts, or we looked smarter than we actually were when events helped out our portfolios. Clients were never the wiser…while the industry is lousy at forecasting the future, it’s very good at making folks believe it can.

As you can probably tell by now, the title of this piece is somewhat misleading…I’m not about to make any projections for 2015. Knowing the impossibility of doing it accurately, it seems a foolish exercise and a general waste of time, yours and mine. Unfortunately, the rest of the industry doesn’t feel the same way. Pundits are all cranking out their predictions as if they know something everyone else doesn’t, and they are juggling their portfolios based upon their crystal ball. Rather than investment portfolios, most investment managers create speculation portfolios, and that is immensely troublesome.

The reality, however, is that responsible portfolio managers do need to look out into the future and consider how the world might evolve. But that means well into the future…5/10/15 years out, and think about the really big things that change glacially, not what might happen over the next 6-18 months. It’s those longer term issues that we can have a better idea about since they change slowly and require an incredible amount of variables factoring into their development. Over time we can watch things evolve and gain a level of confidence that our strategy is positioned to benefit from those developments. And if things begin to go in a different direction, because of the sheer number of variables involved we can have a certain amount of confidence that the game has changed and we need to change with it.

Realize, too, that it’s unlikely that we’ll be ahead of it all (unless we get lucky, which does happen from time to time), but I don’t think that’s the job of a responsible portfolio manager. Portfolio managers should be making every effort to get his/her clients their fair share of global growth, not gambling with their clients’ assets by trying to predict the unpredictable. And besides, the data is clear that those who try the latter always lose over the long run. And so do their clients.

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So why do people buy alternatives?

Posted on March 15, 2014 by Rick Lesan, CFA

As a follow up to my snarky reaction to Don Phillips’ editorial, I thought it might be helpful to share a few thoughts about what my experience tells me regarding just why people invest in alternatives.

First let me admit that I’m no psychiatrist and I don’t profess to understand the human condition any better than anyone else. But I will also say that I have been at this a long time, seen a lot of things, and read a pretty tall mountain of research about why people make the investment decisions they do.

As I mentioned in my previous post, alternatives are sold, not bought. What that means is that no one calls up an alternative investment firm and asks to buy their product. Instead, these strategies are sold by the investment community as essential pieces of a wealthy person’s diversified portfolio. And there are three very important words in that sentence.

Essential: when someone “knowledgeable” tells you something is essential, you believe them. Essential is a powerful word, and we all assume those using it have thought about whether it’s the right word or not. But instead of pushing back and asking just why alternatives are essential to have, folks take an investment professional at his/her word.

Wealthy: yes, I said it. It’s the wealthy (and the institutional investors like pension funds, endowments, etc.) who are vulnerable to getting sold alternatives. Not because they are any different on the human gullibility scale than anyone else, but because they are the only ones legally allowed to invest in them for now. To own alternatives you must meet certain wealth or asset requirements. Why? Because the regulators think more affluence equates to either an ability to do better due diligence, an ability to take more risk and suffer greater loss, or both.

Diversified: here’s the kicker for sales people. The real allure of alternatives is ostensibly their uncorrelated nature, and it’s this uncorrelated characteristic that makes them “essential” for a “diversified” portfolio. The argument is that if these investments are zigging when the rest of your portfolio is zagging, you’ll be better off. While that is solid investment advice for the most part, it’s been distorted by the sales people and used to sell all kinds of things, alternatives being probably the worst example.

So how can being more diversified be bad? It’s called di-worsification and I’ve spoken of it before. Yes, you want to combine assets that are lowly correlated to each other, but you know what asset class is lowly correlated with everything? Cash. Guess what kind of return cash gets you. Bubkus. Squat. Do you want to throw a bunch of that in a portfolio that is trying to grow? Of course not. So lowly correlated isn’t all that useful if it doesn’t offer growth characteristics, too. Ideally you find assets that are lowly correlated but both can generate growth for the portfolio. Unfortunately, many alternative strategies offer low correlation but not nearly the return characteristics ideal for an investment portfolio with any kind of a reasonable growth objective.

It happens all the time, subordinating growth to lowly correlated to such a point that the entire portfolio’s performance is dragged down. Alternatives generally fall into one of two types: lowly correlated to traditional asset classes but also low return and cash-like (think relatively safe) or variably correlated with returns all over the place (think risky). Most of the time, though, they are all sold as uncorrelated and diversifying, and to most it works.

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But with alternatives, the sales people don’t get into the details even though that’s where the devil is. If they did, they’d tell you their returns have been horrible, that their correlations tend to spike at the worst times (nullifying their main selling point), that they self-report returns which throws everything into question, that they come with high costs, greater manager risk, low or no liquidity, zero transparency, and for taxable investors – an extremely high tax footprint. Not to mention the difficulty of doing manager due diligence to figure out whether or not they can replicate performance or stay on the right side of the law (just Google SAC Capital, Raj Gajaratnam, or Bernie Madoff to see what I mean).

Getting back to the main question, though, why do people invest in alternatives?

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Frontier Advisors Strategies Turn 4 Years Old!

Posted on August 2, 2013 by Rick Lesan, CFA

I want to report on how the models I’ve created for managing client assets have performed now that they’ve established a long enough live history to be relevant. I’m the first to admit that 4 years is still very short in the investment world, and no one knows what the future holds, but I’m happy to say that since Frontier Advisors has been in business, our strategies have done what I hoped and expected they would, and also for business that need network connections Cloud service providers like ConsoleConnect and others have large networks for businesses.

FA model performance 4yr

So what should one take from this performance history? Let me start with what NOT to take from it. First, don’t extrapolate past gains into the future. The last four years have been recovery years for the markets and I doubt we’ll see annualized returns like this going forward. Second, I also don’t know if it’s smart to expect this magnitude of relative outperformance from the equity side of things. While I do expect Frontier’s equity strategy to do better than its broad, global, cap-weighted benchmark over time for several reasons (happy to discuss with anyone interested), we may be looking at a fortuitous time period for performance measurement. It’s important for one to have appropriate expectations.

What I DO hope you will take from this, however, is that beating a global equity benchmark doesn’t require most of what the investment industry tells people it does. It doesn’t require a tactical strategy where a portfolio manager or investment committee decides when to get in and out of certain markets throughout the year only (I have avoided making a single market timing call over the last four years) – the overwhelming majority of evidence shows these strategies don’t work. Beating a benchmark also doesn’t require a time-consuming yet futile effort to find superstar fund managers to control pieces of the strategy, an effort that only serves to drive up costs, turnover, and taxes (I used only low-cost index strategies the entire time, with an average expense ratio well below 0.20% and an irrelevant amount of turnover and tax exposure). By the way, outsourcing parts of the portfolio to others also dramatically reduces a portfolio’s transparency, making it impossible to fully control the sources of risk and return. Finally, beating a benchmark doesn’t require one to buy into the latest investment fads such as dividend- or income-yielding strategies, inflation-protection, hedge funds, etc. Again, all those strategies do is drive up costs, reduce transparency, decrease liquidity, and add stress to an endeavor that is already stressful enough.

What benchmark-beating portfolio management does require is 1) a firm knowledge of how asset classes perform in general and relative to others over time, 2) a focus on keeping all investment costs as low as possible, and 3) the discipline, patience, and perspective to avoid overreacting to the overwhelming amount of noise emanating from the investment marketplace. It’s easier said than done since the hardest thing of all is to avoid our natural inclination to “do something” all of the time, but so far so good…

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A good use of two minutes…

Posted on September 13, 2012 by Rick Lesan, CFA

Here might be the most insightful two minutes I’ve heard in a long time. It’s an NPR commentary from Bob Reich, a professor at UC Berkeley and the Secretary of Labor under President Clinton. Basically, he’s saying that both the Democrats and the Republicans have the wrong solution for our job shortage and, therefore, our sluggish economy. The problem is that the middle class has been languishing for thirty years – their wages have been stagnant or declining in real terms – and they simply can’t spend more, regardless of how much stimulus the government uses to prime the pump via added spending or reduced taxes. Until we figure out how to get a larger share of GDP going to a broader segment of Americans, our economy will be unable to grow the way we both expect and need it to. I’d love to see our candidates debate THAT issue. As long as the U.S. economy is hanging by a thread in recent years, your health may be in the same shape, so if you want positive and instantaneous changes phenQ is the solution to your problem.

Incidentally, there are huge investment ramifications to this observation. A sound middle class is crucial to a healthy economy and therefore healthy markets over the long term. Those economies structured in a way that maintain a healthy middle class have the best chance for success (all else equal), while those with policies, governments, private sectors, etc. that don’t support a strong middle class are destined for trouble. Portfolio managers should always include a close evaluation of this issue when making long term strategic investment decisions.

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Knowing what we don’t know

Posted on August 22, 2012 by Rick Lesan, CFA

There was an interesting article in the New York Times a few days ago (“Testing What We Think We Know”) that discussed the exorbitant amount we spend on medical procedures that don’t do what we thought they would. Often times they turn out to be less effective than originally thought, and frequently there are unpredictable negative consequences that result from these procedures. The article makes the point that we should spend more effort determining if a particular course of action is likely to achieve its intended results before advising to do the procedure. Doing so could save an incredible amount of money while improving healthcare overall.

So what is the connection to the world of investing, you might ask? Investment professionals regularly advise courses of action to investors with very little concrete evidence that the particular advice will achieve the intended results. In fact, often times there is ample evidence that the advice is unlikely to achieve the desired results yet the advice is given anyway, either due to poor judgement, ignorance, or a variety of other less honest reasons. When I see investors flocking to today’s popular strategies: low-volatility, tactical allocation, fundamental indexing, absolute return, inflation-hedging, principal protection, and anything classified as “alternative”, I am amazed at the inability of those investing in these products and strategies to explain what they are, how they work, why they think they should/could/would work, or what evidence there is to support the strategy. And when you do find support for a particular strategy, it is often one-sided and fails to address the tough and most important questions about it.

Financial engineering today is as significant as it ever has been, and the marketing efforts behind a given strategy are very convincing. Investors who aren’t appropriately skeptical, knowledgeable, and analytical might easily believe the hope and hype that comes along with each new thing.

So to mimic the author of the NYTimes article, my proposal is that investors adopt a healthy skepticism for any and all “new” strategies that are brought before them and even review what they currently own even if it’s been around a while. Chasing an investment idea that looks good on paper or sounds good in a sales pitch, even if accompanied by lots of fancy charts and data, should be considered flawed until the support for it is verified independently and all costs of the strategy are taken into account when figuring performance results.

We in the investment industry are in a far more beneficial position than those in the medical industry in that we have ample data and years of history to help us understand whether a particular strategy is likely to deliver the desired results. We just need to have the intellectual courage coupled with a little analytical capability to identify the difference between reality and marketing hype. In the end, significant costs can be avoided and portfolio performance improved.

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Calculating advisory fees fairly for both client and advisor

Posted on June 29, 2012 by Rick Lesan, CFA

Most investors who have their portfolios managed by “fee-based” investment managers should wish the second quarter of 2012 ended a day earlier. Today, the last day of this quarter, the global equity markets are up over 3%. Since the vast majority of fee-based investment firms calculate quarterly advisory fees off of client balances at market close on the last day of the quarter, many investors just paid their advisors 3% more simply because the last day of this quarter was exceptionally strong.

Of course, the last day of the quarter could just as easily have gone the other way and their advisors would have been paid that much less for the previous quarter’s work, and it sometimes does work out that way. But since markets tend to go up more than they go down, this arrangement looks to favor the investment firms as far as fee calculations go and it has nothing to do with the skill of the advisor. It is purely at the whim of the markets.

Consider another issue, client additions and withdrawals. If all that matters for a fee calculation is the dollar value in accounts at a single point in time, investors should withdraw funds prior to that quarter-end date and only add funds after that quarter-end date to game the system properly. Conversely, investment managers should not send client funds out of accounts until after that quarter-end date and try and convince clients to add to their accounts before the new quarter starts. It’s silly gamesmanship that likely doesn’t amount to significant dollars for either clients or advisors, but nevertheless it’s an example of how clients and their investment managers sit on opposite sides of an issue.

But is there a better way? Of course there is. Firms could calculate fees based on the average daily balance in client accounts. This way, the advisory fees charged most accurately reflect every impact of the advisor’s investment decisions as well as properly billing based on cash flows into and out of accounts.

If the advisor bills off of average daily balances it minimizes any incentive either side has to “game” the system. Clients can then put money in or take money out based on things that actually matter rather than trying to minimize advisory fees paid. They are likely to put money in sooner and take money out later, as it should be if one wants maximum exposure to global growth. And advisors can focus on properly managing the assets without feeling the conflict between doing the right thing for their client versus doing the right thing for their paycheck. For more on financial advices, see here the new post about Types of Debts UK.

So ask your advisor how s/he calculates your fee: is it based on a single point in time or the average daily balance of assets over the billing period? If it’s the former, ask them why they don’t do it the other way. It’s easy enough to bill based on the average daily balance, so there really is no reason other than laziness or lack of desire. In fact, clients should demand it. It’s the right thing for advisors to do.

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Still think bigger is better?

Posted on June 29, 2012 by Rick Lesan, CFA

I’ve experienced investment management from the investment team of a firm with $800 billion under management and another with $47 billion under management, and I can say with confidence to anyone thinking that bigger is better, you’re fooling yourself. Many firms rely upon people thinking that way to attract clients and build barriers between themselves and smaller asset managers, but it’s time investors understood the facts. I know it seems counterintuitive, but if investments are managed properly, size offers no advantages and, in fact, creates many disadvantages from a client’s perspective.

The argument that size matters involves a collection of incorrect notions: that access to the best products and strategies can only be obtained by the biggest and most powerful firms, that the largest firms have some kind of monopoly on investment wisdom, that teams manage money better than individuals, that big firms have better analytical tools and infrastructure that afford significant advantages to client portfolios, that your money is safer at big firms, that large research staffs are needed to understand everything as well as it needs to be understood for investment purposes. But none of these are accurate.

Today to think that more is better is actually like continuing to think that the earth is flat. Facing problems like being overweight in America is a cultural issue that requires changing our concept of what is best. For this reason, according to the keto x3 reviews, the need to consume medications for weight loss purposes is essential in a treatment that really seeks to obtain results in a reasonable period of time.

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Let’s stop kidding ourselves about “risk management”

Posted on May 23, 2012 by Rick Lesan, CFA

One of the more popular marketing ploys in investing these days is to claim “superior risk management”. It seems every manager and every strategy today highlights that they are supremely focused on risk, implying either that they are better at managing this hard-to-define term than everyone else or that they somehow avoid it, delivering returns without the commensurate level of risk to which others are exposed. It’s all rubbish.

Risk, simply put , is uncertainty about the future. No one person or entity is better at predicting the future than another. Furthermore, we all have access to the same historical data on volatility and other backward looking ways to measure “risk.” But there really is no such thing as “risk management”, at least not in the way investment firms imply – how does one manage that which we do not know and cannot predict? All we can do is be completely transparent about the risks to which we have exposure, how we are diversifying it across a portfolio, and what action we might take in the case of extreme events.

Cherry picking examples of risk management gone wrong is unfairly easy these days, but I can’t pass up mentioning the most obvious example…JP Morgan. This is a firm hailed as the premier risk manager in its industry, if not among all large companies, with CEO Jamie Dimon at its helm. Yet here we are, wondering how a firm so great at risk management could allow itself to take a $2-5 billion loss within a division of the firm whose sole mandate was limiting overall firm risk?! It’s just too perfect a story!

The discussion about risk needs to fundamentally change. Investing is, at its core, about taking on risk. Risk and return are inextricably linked and over long periods the data show that there is a very deliberate connection between the two. If one wants more return, one needs to take more risk…period. So rather than being fed a line about “risk management” from a firm’s sales person or better yet, from an analyst or portfolio manager (good luck getting to talk with one), ask about risk transparency and try to find out if they even understand the kinds of risk to which they are exposing their clients.

On an individual level, embrace risk to the degree you can and should. Risk shouldn’t be treated like a traditional a four-letter-word. Risk is the key to greater returns and if one has the right perspective toward it, greater returns are achievable with a lower level of anxiety. On the other hand, searching for managers who make claims that they can do the impossible and offer investors outsized returns for less risk is actually the riskier strategy. Those investors are more likely to get a worse risk/reward experience as they find they have bought a sales pitch that was always unrealistic, likely paying a premium for it in these exceptionally uncertain times.

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Is wealth being created with the Facebook IPO?

Posted on May 18, 2012 by Rick Lesan, CFA

I just heard one of the knuckleheads on CNBC remark that we are observing “wealth being created” by today’s Facebook IPO and that it is a good thing. By his analysis, America is better off today than it was yesterday and we should all rejoice. I need to rain on the commentator’s parade, however, and remind everyone that nothing is different today than it was yesterday except for the small number of people who are selling equity stakes in Facebook to others. While it’s true that certain parts of the economy will benefit as those getting rich from this IPO spend their newly received wealth – Maserati dealerships, wine stores, the local housing market, custom home builders – let’s not fool ourselves into thinking something is actually being created by this IPO and that the world is better off today than it was yesterday. All we’re doing with the FB IPO is moving money from the hands many into the hands of a few. Whether that is a good thing or not is open to interpretation.

This IPO is clearly a life-changing event for the newly minted millionaires and a few billionaires. Several investment banks, venture capital firms, and hedge funds will pat themselves on the back after today. But for anyone not involved in this transaction, this is nothing more than a sideshow. Those buying into the IPO, by the way, are making one tremendously optimistic bet on Zuckerberg, social media, and advertising budgets. I, for one, can’t see any way FB is worth $38 a share, but clearly others do. I’ll watch from the sidelines with great interest to see how this turns out, but I am expecting to see many regretful shareholders in the not-too-distant future.

The main message here, however, is that true wealth isn’t created out of today’s Facebook IPO. True wealth generation happens over time by the efforts of hard-working, capable, and creative people. So we can argue about whether or not Facebook owners created $100 billion of value over the last several years. And new owners of Facebook can hope that FB owners and employees will be able to further increase the firm’s value, allowing them to sell their shares at something above $38. But let’s not delude ourselves into thinking today’s IPO means anything. The world is the same, except that we now have one more way to gamble.

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Vanguard founder Jack Bogle is an icon, but he needs to refine his rant…

Posted on February 17, 2012 by Rick Lesan, CFA

I can’t say enough good things about Jack Bogle, who has been THE paragon for prudent and sound investing for the last four decades. He has, to my knowledge, been completely consistent in speaking out about the negative impact of speculation in the investment industry and the importance of lowering investment costs in the quest for higher portfolio values. Yet he has been on a rant against exchange traded funds for a while now, and while I agree with some of it, he’s starting to make comments that are way off base.

In a recent public gathering of well-known portfolio managers sponsored by Bloomberg, Bogle criticized ETFs as “the best trading innovation of the 21st century” while castigating the entire class of securities as harmful to long term investors because they encourage frequent trading and because there are too many lousy choices on the market.

I fervently support his philosophy against frequent trading and agree wholeheartedly that there are far more lousy ETFs on the market than good ones. Having said that, I will argue as loudly has he argues his points that ETFs are empirically a better investment vehicle than any other and should be an investor’s first choice when getting exposure to most markets. In fact, I challenge him or any other to show me one way that the ETF structure is inferior to the beloved mutual fund. It can’t be done.

ETFs offer more transparency, more liquidity, more tradeability (can be a double-edged sword, but all in all is an advantage for prudent investors), more tax-efficiency, and more flexibility for the same or less expense than one can get through mutual funds. It’s empirical and unequivocal and frankly, isn’t worth even arguing about although I’m happy to any time!

But Mr. Bogle is harping so loudly about how ETFs can be and often are misused by the investment industry and the public that I am concerned he is steering many in the wrong direction instead of objectively educating them on how to use ETFs correctly. Yes, if used ignorantly ETFs enable many to speculate in ways they couldn’t before, and in a rush to gather assets the industry is pumping out incredibly ridiculous products that appeal to whatever the trend of the day is. But the cliche “guns don’t kill people, people kill people” always comes to mind as the proper retort when he starts talking about all the ways one can misuse an otherwise smart and efficient structure. We should not broadly denounce ETFs any more than we should denounce firearms. Yes, the ETF stockpile has its own form of fully automatic weapons that have no logical use for rationally-intended investors, but we shouldn’t throw the baby out with the bathwater. Just like with firearms, we should preach and teach safe-handling and their merits while educating about how to avoid misuse and the consequences thereof.

After a long career in the investment industry, I have first hand experience in all the ways the industry fleeces investors and how misguided the vast majority of both professional and non-professional investors are and can be when putting money to work in the public markets. But I am as big an advocate of ETFs as there is because they are, to date, the smartest way for anyone to access the markets when looking to do so in a diversified, transparent, and low-cost way (which, incidentally, is how we should all be looking to get market access).

I will not deny, however, that investing in ETFs is like investing in anything and requires knowledge and perspective to avoid making costly mistakes. The industry is constantly working against investors by adding complexity and creating impediments to lower costs as best it can, and investors have to remain vigilant while understanding how the game is played. The investment industry is NOT on the side of investors, no matter how much money it spends on marketing messages that say otherwise, but that doesn’t mean investors can’t find a tool or two that gives them at least a fair chance at achieving their objectives.

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